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Paradoxa of Relevance and Constraints on Diagnostic Categories 
Arthur Merin, Konstanz 
1. Genesis of Diagnostic Categories  
Bodies of collective knowledge evolve through individual 
action, like all products that have a use. They also can be 
evaluated from the engineer's optimizing design perspec-
tive. But can individual participants in their making 
recognize local optimality? Can they work to realize it? Are 
they unable to act seriosly in a way that would ensure 
acquisition of a certain suboptimal design feature?  
One might hope for a simple answer: appeal to innate 
constraints on the form of categorization. But such con-
straints cannot wholly pre-empt the need for individual 
checks and thus for agency. The use of categorial 
schemes engages facts about the world that do not leap to 
the eye. They are unlike syntactic or phonological con-
straints of language, or edge-and orientation-detection 
algorithms of visual perception.  
What we should thus be looking for will be modest: 
constraints, innate or otherwise, that rule out the choice of 
categorial schemes which are clearly suboptimal and that 
are, in principle, open to agents' instant observation. We 
look to a limited if important domain of systematic knowl-
edge: medical diagnostic knowledge.  
2. Basic Bayesian Reasonings  
Signs or symptoms are not usually certain signs of 
diseases. A dry cough or hypertension could each be 
associated with many diverse diseases. Observing one or 
several symptoms will perhaps make a certain disease 
more likely, but it need not be a conclusive sign of it.  
Bayesian reasoning with probability constraints is a well-
explored framework for dealing with such inconclusive 
evidential relations. Its laws specify how the impact of 
evidence E is to transform prior probabilities P(H) of a 
hypothesis H or its odds P(H)/P(-H) into posterior 
probabilities P(H|E) or odds P(H|E)/P(-H|E). We obtain 
posterior odds by multiplying prior odds with the Bayes-
Factor, P(E|H)/P(E|-H). Probability constraints represent a 
belief- or (possibly partial) knowledge-state. Bayesian 
networks are sets of probability constraints that represent 
probabilistic dependencies between variables, in our 
example between indicator variables X[K] whose values 
represent the truth of complementary propositions, K and –
K, respectively. If there is some pair (H1,E1) of values of 
the variables X[H] and X[E], such that P(H1|E1) > P(H1), 
then the variables are said to be probabilistically depend-
ent in a doxastic state P. A special case is deterministic 
dependence, when P(H1) < P(H1|E1) = 1.  
To become computationally tractable, Bayesian nets rely 
on simplifying assumptions, particularly conditional inde-
pendence assumptions. Propositions A and B are condi-
tionally independent given proposition H under a probabil-
ity function P iff P(AB|H) = P(A|H)P(B|H). (Unconditional 
independence is the special case where H is the tautol-
ogy.) Independence conditional on a variable X[H] is inde-
pendence conditional on each of the cells of the propo-
sitional bipartition {H,-H} of the space of possibilities. Call 
this doubly conditional independence (DCI). It is this 
condition which is crucial to Reichenbach's (1956) expli-
cation of a Common Cause (CC).  
A necessary condition on H being a CC of A and B is 
that AB are DCI under H and are both positively relevant to 
H. (Temporal precedence of H is the remaining definitional 
requirement. Without this requirement we might simply 
speak of H as a 'common reason' (CR) for A and for B.)  
DCI implies that A and B each positive to H are posi-
tively relevant also to one another. This suggests a 
common procedure. We search for common causes on 
observing a dependence (positive correlation) of A and B. 
We then infer as a CC or CR some condition H as yet 
unknown to us that we next go and search for.  
Another and immediately obvious formal consequence 
of DCI is that the relevance of A and B to H, i.e. a measure 
of their evidential import for A, becomes compositional 
when assessed by the Bayes Factor: now P(AB|H)/P(AB|-
H) = [P(A|H)/P(A|-H)]x[P(B|H)/P(B|-H)]. Taking logarithms 
we have the relevance of AB as the sum of relevances of 
A and of B.  
Common Cause and Compositionality, both associated 
with DCI have given rise to a suggestive and, in its way, 
Kantian hypothesis. We postulate causes H (causal 
variables X[H])in order to reap the computational advan-
tages of the condition, DCI, which goes into defining CC. 
The original context of this suggestion was medical 
diagnosis.  
3. Computation, Causes and Syndromes  
A syndrome, says the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary of 
1983, is "a group of symptoms or pathological signs which 
consistently occur together, especially with an (originally) 
unknown cause; a condition characterized by such a set of 
associated symptoms." It is in this latter, rather liberal 
sense of "condition" that the epistemological literature on 
diagnostic categories appears to use the term "syndrome".  
Charniak (1983) conjectured that medical diagnostic 
categories ("syndromes") are formed so as to afford 
independence of possible observations ("symptoms") 
conditional on presence of the syndrome [CI]. Pearl 
(1988:44) amplifies. Conditional independence on a 
syndrome variable i.e. DCI, allows probabilistic reasoning 
on dependencies to be decomposed into a set of inde-
pendent subtasks in stages, using simple vector opera-
tions. Such simplicity, surmises Pearl, makes conditional 
independence a psychological necessity (presumably: 
wherever it can readily be assumed). "It may be to reap 
the computational advantages associated with such 
independence", concludes Pearl, "that we organize most of 
our knowledge in causal hierarchies."  
Pearl's thesis on the structure and evolution of diagnos-
tic categorial schemes is a philosophical hypothesis of the 
empirical kind. But, as stated and motivated, it is not 
readily testable. Numerical data are not generally available 
to verify whether the DCI constraint or at least composi-
tionality of evidence holds in many particular cases. Thus 




we could not expect a reliable answer if we asked a 
physician:  
If A and B are symptoms of H, will the indicator random 
variable X[H] fully account for the dependence between 
them?  
Indeed, even if we made allowances for erroneous 
assumptions of conditional independence (in line with a 
ubiquitous tendency to assume independence where, in 
fact, it fails to hold), we should most likely draw a blank. 
This is not a question many physicians will be able to 
answer decisively. The same will be true for less fastidious 
and perhaps more intuitable, but reasonably unanswerable 
questions such as  
If A and B are symptoms of H, will this ensure that A is 
not a cause of B, nor B a cause of A, yet each is a sign 
that the other will occur?  
A more careful variant, again, is still problematic:  
If A and B are symptoms of H, and if you either know for 
sure that H or know for sure that -H, will the presence of 
A or of B neither decrease nor increase your surprise at 
observing the other?  
The condition where H is known might seem palatable as 
the basis for an exercise of the medical imagination. But 
the condition -H seems hard to fathom. (At least part of the 
problem seems to stem from psycholinguistic problems. 
But we have to contend with them.)  
So what is wanted is a scheme of scanning diagnostic 
categories for possible counterexamples to Pearl's or even 
Charniak's thesis. Also wanted is a criterion that might 
guide individual agents of evolution. Syndrome categories 
are, after all, introduced or at least proposed by individual 
members of the medical community. And then we must 
ask: How can individual proponents of a taxonomic 
decision avoid suboptimal acts of category formation when 
they lack, as they must, the hindsight of the evolutionary 
long run which lies ahead of them?  
4. Paradoxa of Relevance  
The probability calculus admits well-known paradoxa of 
relevance (Carnap 1950: Ch.6 gives an exhaustive and 
exhausting discussion). Probability models can be 
constructed which satisfy one or the other of the following 
conditions:  
A and B are positive to H, but AB is negative to H.  
A and B are positive to H, but AvB is negative to H.  
AB is positive to H, but AvB is negative to H.  
Paradox (i) has non-medical examples readily constructed 
to model it. Paradox (ii) is less readily imagined on the 
spot, but is well known as Simpson's Paradox. By De 
Morgan's equivalence and recalling that negation reverses 
relevance sign, we find that (i) is the condition -A and -B 
negative to H, -Av-B positive to H. So, formally, any 
instance of (i) and (ii) is also an instance of the other 
modulo sign. Predicament (iii) holds whenever (i) or (ii) 
holds and will be of no substantive further interest to us. 
(Its necessary and sufficient conditions allow one of A and 
B to have zero relevance to H.)  
What makes (i) and (ii) counterintuitive? A first answer is 
that their analogues cannot arise in deductive, i.e 
conclusive reasoning. A proposition E is negative to a 
proposition H iff positive to -H. Now recall (i)-(iii) and 
replace in them "positive to" by "entails", and "negative to" 
by "entails the contradictory of". None of the conditions 
thus obtained is satisfiable. If both A and B entail H, then 
so do AB and AvB. If AB entails H, AvB cannot entail -H. 
The same will hold analogously when probability is used to 
explicate a notion of non-vacuous doxastic entailment, 
P(H|E) = 1 > P(H), of extreme positive relevance of some 
E to H. Relevance configurations which cannot be retained 
smoothly when relevance goes to the extreme are 
presumably unnatural. But there are also prima facie 
different considerations involved.  
5. Doubly Conditional Independence blocks 
Paradox  
Neither of the paradoxa can arise under DCI. 
FACT 1: If A and B are DCI on {H,-H} and both are 
positive to H, then AB and AvB are also positive to H.  
The proof is immediate. DCI ensures multiplicativity of 
Bayes factors. If both A and B are positive to H, their 
Bayes factors each exceed 1, and hence their product, 
equal to the Bayes factor of AB, must exceed 1. That 
Paradox (ii) is ruled out by DCI is less obvious to immedi-
ate intuition. But of course it is, as the structural equiva-
lence to (i) already tells us and direct proof easily confirms. 
Probability models are also readily constructed to 
demonstrate  
FACT 2: CI is insufficient to rule out evidential paradox.  
FACT 3: Neither DCI nor even CI is necessary for 
compositionality (log-Bayes factor additivity) of evidential 
weight.  
Fact 2 tells us that entailment by H, which makes for CI is 
not enough. Fact 3 would be a little worrisome if DCI were 
our prime target. (Only a little, though. DCI guarantees 
compositionality, and, since it can be specified elegantly, 
having DCI is better than hoping for haphazard composi-
tionality). However, what we are after is additivity of 
evidence.  
Since paradox (i) (hence paradox (ii)) is always a 
counterexample to additivity of evidence, category creators 
who failed to avoid it would be performing an act domi-
nated with respect to computational optimality of the 
conceptual scheme to be extended. They would also 
ensure that their syndrome could not label a Reichenbach 
Common Cause of their observables. 
6. Individual Intuitions and Natural Catego-
ries  
Pearl's hypothesis is not readily verified, we noted. 
However, it is readily falsifiable. A diagnostic categorial 
scheme which admitted paradox of relevance would be a 
counterexample.  
Now, Simpson's Paradox does affect real-life probabilis-
tic reasoning. But its typical configurations (the Berkeley 
admissions paradox or inverse effects of medical treatment 
in sub-populations and their aggregate) are not instances 
of syndrome and symptoms. They do not involve what 
might be called 'natural' cultural categories.  
Thus we should look at natural categories and doxastic 
agents in our chosen domain. I have informally checked 
physicians from a variety of specializations for incidence of 
paradoxical syndrome-symptom configurations. None 
could come up with a real medical configuration of 




syndrome and symptoms that made for evidential paradox 
under either formulation (i), (ii) or (iii). None could even 
make up such a constellation for the nonce.  
Perhaps the latter failure simply shows that the physi-
cians queried lack imagination, the kind which philoso-
phers are trained to acquire. Yet (the?) two philosophers 
who have treated of the paradoxa of relevance in a 
medical setting, Rudolf Carnap and Wesley Salmon, also 
exhibit a similar and very sensible blind spot of the ima-
gination. Both authors refer to abstract constellations (i), 
(ii), Carnap also to (iii). Both make up medical (pseudo)-
examples to illustrate paradoxical eviedential situations. 
But the examples constructed, involving three proposi-
tional variables, are never instances of two symptoms 
each speaking for a syndrome, while their conjunction or 
disjunction speaks against.  
Carnap (1950:367), in ostensible illustration of paradox 
(ii), considers, with uncharacteristic opacity, two putative 
syndromes ("virus pneumonia" (H), "bacillus pneumonia" 
(G)) speaking for a hypothesis that does not itself have 
either symptom or syndrome status. He does not offer two 
symptoms speaking for a syndrome. Salmon (1975:27) 
constructs transparent scenarios where evidence E is posi-
tive to each of Carnap's H, G, but is negative to HG or 
HvG. Substantive plausibility apart, this does not, again, 
illustrate the syndrome/symptom relation to be tested.  
Even philosophers have not so far then, it seems, made 
up examples violating the "Avoid paradox" constraint on 
possible syndrome-symptoms configurations. Such con-
figurations look like being unimaginable, as soon as our 
imagination is informed by constraints of subjective but 
serious possibility for the specific domain in question.  
A significantly sized class of possible instances of 
diagnostic categorial schemes will thus be ruled out by 
individual categorizer's inability to entertain or unwilling-
ness to admit schemes which make for paradox. These  
 
 
schemes are bound to violate compositionality of sympto-
matic evidence for a syndrome, and in doing so they 
violate DCI, which is a sufficient condition for it. Hence we 
have a useful constraint on formation of possible categorial 
schemes. One must suspect that our penchant to search 
for causes -- common causes -- i.e. for an etiology that 
reveals an H which can be acted on remedially is the real 
driving force for this: that we are, as Lichtenberg puts it, 
causational animals ,"Ursachentiere". Yet whichever of CC 
or Compositionality we alight upon, paradox-freedom is its 
tangible signpost. 
We can interpret the observed constraint in two ways. 
First, it might be seen as concrete evidence that human 
minds are simply built to work in the way that Pearl 
hypothesizes it does. Secondly, it can be seen as an 
intuitive check for individuals not so built, against propos-
als, their own or others’, of a categorial scheme which is 
bound to violate a sufficient condition for evidential compo-
sitionality. 
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